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Abstract 
Biofuels  are  increasingly  being  produced  and  consumed  as  a  partial  substitute  to 
fossil-fuel  based  transport  fuels  in  the  fight  against  climate  change.  One  policy 
introduced recently by some countries to help ensure biofuels perform better than 
fossil fuels environmentally is sustainability criteria. These, typically, require lower 
greenhouse gas emissions than fossil fuels, considering not only their use but also 
production. Concerns have been expressed from various quarters that such criteria 
could represent WTO-incompatible barriers to trade. The present paper addresses two 
specific issues. First, it argues that biofuels should be treated like any other traded 
product  under  WTO  law,  in  particular  the  GATT  agreement.  Thus  an  importing 
country could not impose different trade measures dependent on whether the biofuel 
was  produced  according  to  its  sustainability  criteria.  Second,  the  TBT  Agreement 
provides guidance on how to draw up international standards that can help ensure 
WTO compatibility. This cannot guarantee such compatibility, but it can help reduce 
significantly  the  chances  of  WTO  Members  bringing  actions  against  a  fellow 
Member’s biofuels sustainability criteria. There is little direct case law to draw upon, 
but it is argued that, if the TBT guidance is followed, in the long term the absence of 
case law can be taken as an indication that sustainability criteria are WTO-compatible. 
 
* The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the ESRC, Small Research Grant RES-
000-22-3607. They also thank the many policy-makers, industry officials and experts interviewed for 
this project who gave their time so freely and willingly but who, in accordance with their wishes and 
the precepts of research ethics, must remain anonymous. An earlier version of this paper was presented 
to  a  joint  EUBIONET3-International  Energy  Agency  Task  40  workshop  “International  trade  of 
bioenergy  commodities:  experiences  with  certification  and  setting  up  sustainable  supply  chains”, 
hosted by GSE, Rome, 21 October 2010. The authors thank participants for their comments. They also 
thank Graham Ferris of Nottingham Law School for helping them chart a path through the minefield of 
WTO law.   4 
WTO Regulations and Bioenergy Sustainability Certification – 
Synergies and Possible Conflicts 
 
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be 
conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large 
and  steadily  growing  volume  of  real  income  and  effective  demand,  and  expanding  the 
production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the 
world's resources in accordance  with the objective of sustainable development, seeking 
both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a 
manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic 
development 
    Part of the Preamble to the Agreement Establishing the WTO 
 
Introduction 
In the last decade, as the production of feedstocks and their conversion into bioenergy, 
notably  biofuels,  has  expanded  dramatically  (encouraged  in  most  countries  by 
substantial  public  policy  interventions  and  incentives),  a  range  of  policy  issues, 
problems and controversies have emerged. The purpose of this paper is to address just 
one of these: the WTO compatibility of sustainability certification systems. Whilst the 
production of bioenergy was conceived mainly as a domestic solution to domestic 
energy concerns, international trade in bioenergy products has begun to emerge. One 
of  the  energy  concerns  countries  seek  to  address  with  biofuels  is  fossil  fuels’ 
contribution to carbon emissions and global warming. This focus has, in turn, led to 
much attention being paid to these aspects of biofuels production and usage. 
 
Concern  over  the  environmental  impact  of  biofuels  production  has  given  rise  to 
concerns over their ‘sustainability’, as it would be contradictory if different types of 
biofuels produced in different countries – trade in which is relatively new but with the 
potential to expand very substantially very quickly – failed to address appropriately 
these  concerns.  This  has  raised  questions  as  to  whether  criteria  and  certification 
systems put in place to try to ensure biofuels production is sustainable also conform to 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules and principles. As the quote at the start of this 
paper  indicates,  policies  which  protect  and  preserve  the  environment  are  given 
validity in this context. Yet to what extent can the standard trade liberalising logic of 
the WTO, concerning market access, market shares and trade liberalisation, apply in   5 
this  case?  Domestic  public  policy  creates  both  the  market  and  the  sustainability 
standards;  they  are  mutually  constitutive  rather  than  having  a  pre-existing  market 
which the public policy instrument comes along subsequently to protect. 
 
As the policy issue of environmental sustainability has emerged and become more 
prominent, so a literature has sought to determine the WTO-compatibility of biofuels 
sustainability criteria and standards (see, inter alia, Howse et al, 2006; Charnovitz et 
al, 2008; Erixon, 2009; Echols, 2009; Swinbank, 2009; Lendle and Schaus, 2010). 
Furthermore a number of papers, written largely but not exclusively by legal scholars, 
ponder explicitly the legal possibility of whether biofuels can be treated differently in 
terms of trade policy instruments, depending on whether they have been produced 
sustainably or not (see, inter alia, Switzer, 2007; De Vera, 2008; Tarasofsky, 2008; 
Condon,  2009;  de  Gorter  and  Just,  2009;  Mitchell  and  Tran,  2009;  Switzer  and 
McMahon, 2010). 
 
We do not seek to challenge this legal analysis but instead argue that, from a policy 
perspective, the key trade policy concern is simple: WTO rules and such case law as 
exists suggest that biofuels will not be allowed to have differential policy treatment 
based  on  the  sustainability  of  production.  The  focus  thus  shifts  to  ensuring  that 
sustainability standards (principally on the import/consumption side) and certification 
systems (principally on  the export/production side) are compatible both with each 
other and with WTO rules and precepts. Thus we argue that the core principles of the 
General Agreement on tariffs and Trade (GATT) apply to biofuels and that the TBTA 
provides  guidance  as  to  the  establishment  of  WTO-compatible  standards  and 
certification  systems.  This  does  not  eliminate  the  possibility  of  challenges  against 
sustainability criteria, but following certain clear rules can help reduce the chances of 
a challenge occurring. 
 
The paper, first, outlines EU and US sustainability criteria. Second, we highlight the 
principal GATT articles relevant to biofuels sustainability criteria and consider how 
potential trade problems –and thus possible actions at the WTO – can be avoided. 
Third, we consider how the development of sustainability criteria in an international 
setting, in accordance with principles laid down in WTO Agreements, creates wider 
synergies  that  can  enhance  international  biofuels  trade  further.  What  this  shows,   6 
ultimately, is that biofuels are not a commodity apart from others in the WTO, given 
rules that are determined by broad principles rather than the specific details of any one 
commodity.  That  said,  although  the  options  for  ensuring  the  WTO-compliance  of 
biofuels sustainability criteria are limited, not only do they exist, the lack of number 
of options helps make the feasible alternatives much clearer. This paper focuses on 
biofuels for transport, bioethanol and biodiesel, because these are the dominant forms 
of traded bioenergy for which sustainability issues are currently arising. 
 
Biofuels Sustainability Criteria – An Introduction 
Biofuels, transport fuels derived from specific types of plant matter, are seen as one 
weapon in the fight against carbon emissions causing (anthropogenic) climate change. 
It is therefore not surprising that biofuels are being put under great scrutiny to ensure 
the  carbon  emissions  from  biofuels  production  and  use  provides  lower  carbon 
emissions than the fossil-fuels they are replacing. One specific aspect of this is the 
conditions under which biofuels are produced. Concerns over this have given rise to 
some of the major consuming countries – notably the EU and US – setting up biofuels 
sustainability criteria. 
 
Considering EU policy first, the legislation which effectively marks the beginning of 
EU policy is the 2003 Biofuels Directive (so-called).
1 This set voluntary targets for 
the percentage of transport fuels to be represented by biofuels or other renewables; of 
2% by the end of 2005 and 5.75% by the end of 2010. Article 3(4) asks member states, 
in the measures they take, to “consider the overall climate and environmental balance 
of the various types of biofuels and other renewable fuels and may give priority to the 
promotion of those fuels showing a very good cost-effective environmental balance, 
while also taking into account competitiveness and security of supply.” Thus in this 
first phase of biofuels promotion, member states should think about environmental 
factors, but alongside (and possibly trumped by) other economic concerns. 
 
On the other hand, Article 4(2) of the Biofuels Directive requires the Commission 
every two years, starting no later than the end of 2006, to report on member states 
                                                            
1 Directive 2003/30/EC of 8 May 2003 on the Promotion of the Use of Biofuels or Other Renewable 
Fuels for Transport. Official Journal of the European Union L123, 17.5.2003, pp. 42-46.   7 
progress.  This  should  address  no  only  their  biofuels  incorporation  rates,  but  also 
economic  and  environmental  considerations  of  further  increase  in  biofuels  use 
(Article 4(2)b); a life-cycle perspective (not ‘analysis’) on biofuels, to see if some are 
both “climate and environmentally friendly” and potentially “competitive and cost 
efficient”  (Article  4(2)c);  and  how  sustainable  the  production  of  the  feedstocks  is 
(Article 4(2)d). Thus, in future, environmental and economic factors are given more 
equal weight, with  explicit consideration having to be  given to the environmental 
impacts of biofuels production and use. 
 
These concerns are returned to in Commission of the European Communities, 2005: 9. 
In that report, the Commission commits to addressing “national targets for the market 
share of biofuels”; “using biofuels obligations”; and, representing an important shift 
in thinking about how to create incentives for biofuels use, “requiring that, through a 
system  of  certificates,  only  biofuels  whose  cultivation  complies  with  minimum 
sustainability standards will count towards the targets.” Moreover, recognising early 
on  that  measures  should  be  WTO-compatible,  the  Commission  is  clear  that  “the 
system  of  certificates  would  need  to  apply  in  a  non-discriminatory  way  to 
domestically produced biofuels and imports.” This is explored further below. 
 
The  progress  report  (Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  2007)  marks  an 
important pre-cursor to the EU sustainability criteria that would then find their way 
into EU legislation in 2009, in Article 17 of the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) 
and Article 7(b) of the Fuel Quality Directive (FQD).
2 It is beyond the scope of the 
present paper to chart the details of this legislative end game in detail (see also, inter 
alia, the Explanatory Memorandum to Commission of the European Communities 
2008a;  and  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  2008b).  The  sustainability 
criteria introduced simultaneously into the RED and revised FQD thus address the 
following  issues,  compliance  with  which  is  required  to  ensure  the  biofuels  count 
towards national and EU targets and eligibility for financial assistance. 
                                                            
2 Respectively, Directive 2009/28/EC of 23 April 2009 on the Promotion and the use of Energy from 
Renewable Sources... Official Journal of the European Union L140, 5.6.2009, pp. 16-62; Directive 
2009/30/EC of 23 April 2009 Amending Directive 98/70/EC as Regards the Specification of Petrol, 
Diesel  and  Gas-Oil  and  Introducing  a  Mechanism  to  Monitor  and  Reduce  Greenhouse  Gas 
Emissions…. Official Journal of the European Union L140, 17.5.2003, pp. 88-113.   8 
 
First, biofuels must deliver greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions over fossil 
fuels – at least 35% initially (or from 2013 if the production facility was operating 
before 2008); at least 50% for 2017. From 2018, biofuels produced in plants which 
began production in 2017 must deliver savings of at least 60%. Details are provided 
for how to calculate these GHG emissions reductions. 
 
Second, biofuels feedstock production cannot occur on certain types of land with a 
specific function or status before 2008. Lands excluded for biodiversity reasons are. 
•  primary forests and woods, undisturbed or lacking “visible” human activity; 
•  land  protected  under  law,  international  or  inter-governmental  agreement  (unless 
feedstock production did not compromise the nature-protection goals); 
•  highly biodiverse grassland (except, for “non-natural” grassland, if biofuel feedstock 
harvesting is required for grassland status to be maintained). NB By the end of 2010, 
the Commission had still to produce a definition of highly biodiverse grassland. 
 
A  second  set  of  exclusions  are  based  on  the  carbon  that  would  be  released  from 
certain types of land if disturbed by feedstock production: 
•  wetlands; 
•  continuously forested area; 
•  undrained peatland (unless feedstock production and harvesting does not require the 
land to be drained). 
 
In addition, and important for the WTO context, these criteria apply to all feedstocks 
sourced within and outside the EU. Also, member states cannot impose additional and 
more stringent requirements than these. Furthermore, in the two-yearly reports to be 
submitted by the Commission from 2012, reference shall be made to whether or not 
countries that are a significant source of feedstocks (again, inside and outside the EU), 
have  implemented  a  range  of  International  Labour  Organisation  Conventions,  the 
Cartagena  Protocol  on  Biosafety  and  the  Convention  on  International  Trade  in 
Endangered  Species  of  Wild  Fauna  and  Flora.  As  discussed  further  below,  it  is 
significant that whilst social criteria are a compulsory part of the reporting process, 
they are not part of the formal criteria which define biofuels sustainability. 
   9 
In the US, we begin the biofuel story with the Energy Policy Act (EPAct) of 2005. 
This amended the Clean Air Act to incorporate a Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), 
setting s (low) statutory blending percentage for ethanol in gasoline (2.78% in 2006, 
the first full year of operation, for example. This is equivalent to 4 billion gallons, a 
figure  scheduled  to  rise  to  7.5  billion  gallons  by  2012).  Enforcement  was  via 
Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs), which were required to prove renewables 
had been added to transport fuels (and which were, in turn, the means of providing 
firms with access to federal program support). That said, the definition of renewable 
fuel for which the RINs were issued was “any motor vehicle fuel that is used to replace or 
reduce the quantity of fossil fuel present in a fuel mixture used to fuel a motor vehicle” based 
on, inter alia, various named feedstocks. It thus lacked any reference to what we now 
understand as sustainability concerns (see Title XV, Subtitle A). 
 
This situation was changed just two  years later, however, with the passing of the 
Energy  Independence  and  Security  Act  (EISA).  This  requires  that  to  qualify  as  a 
renewable  fuel  (and  thus  for  a  RIN),  there  must  be  a  life-cycle  GHG  emissions 
reduction  of  20%  for  ‘standard’  renewables  compared  with  the  fossil  fuels  they 
replace,  50%  for  ‘advanced  biofuel’  and  for  ‘biomass-based  diesel’,  and  60%  for 
‘cellulosic biofuel’. The EISA also defined the meaning of renewable biomass with 
reference to sustainability concerns (see Title II, Subtitle A). The key features are: 
 
•  Planted crops and crop residue harvested from agricultural land cleared or cultivated 
before 19 December 2007 either actively managed or fallow, and nonforested; 
•  Planted trees and tree residue from actively managed tree plantations on non-federal 
land cleared before 19 December 2007; 
•  Animal waste material and animal byproducts. 
•  Slash and pre-commercial thinnings that are from non-federal forestlands, excluding 
forests or forestlands that are critically imperiled, imperiled or rare; and old growth or 
late successional forest; 
•  Biomass obtained from the immediate vicinity of buildings and other areas regularly 
occupied by people, or of public infrastructure, at risk from wildfire. 
•  Algae. 
•  Separated yard waste or food waste, including recycled cooking and trap grease. 
   10 
Thus EU and US standards have both similar features and notable differences. Both 
identify specific land and production types, both target GHG emissions reductions, 
both  make  the  receipt  of  economic  benefits  conditional  on  compliance  with  the 
criteria and both benchmark international agreements. On the other hand, only the US 
refers  explicitly  to  advanced  biofuels,  whilst  production  from  older  plants  must 
deliver on GHG emissions reductions targets after a few years in the EU, whereas in 
the  US  older  production  facilities  are  grandfathered.  A  further  distinction  can  be 
inferred from the wording of these criteria, in the light of the wider context of policy – 
EU criteria, explicitly, refer to imports (insofar as the criteria apply equally to biofuels 
and  feedstocks  sourced  within  and  outside  the  EU);  US  criteria,  however  focus 
primarily on domestic production. 
 
WTO Trade Concerns 
The principal concern of the present paper is the extent to which sustainability criteria 
are consistent with WTO rules. With biofuels production and trade being so new, 
there is very little direct legal or case evidence to work on. General legal principles 
embedded in the WTO agreements, tested via non-biofuels case law, can be drawn 
upon for guidance. Implicit in this is a facet of biofuels trade that is central to the 
subsequent analysis – biofuels, as a product group, will not be treated differently to 
other goods in the WTO. This brings us to the first issue, one that we outline only 
briefly.  Currently,  there  is  no  distinct  Harmonised  Commodity  Description  and 
Coding System (HS)  classification for either ethanol or biodiesel.  Indeed, Harmer 
(2009: 5) argues this is where an analysis of biofuels trade needs to start. 
 
Of these two biofuels – ethanol – is classified under HS Chapter 22 (“beverages, 
spirits  and  vinegar”),  whilst  biodiesel  is  classified  under  HS  Chapter  38 
(“miscellaneous chemical products”). Moreover, ethanol can be either undenatured 
ethyl alcohol (HS 2207.10), or denatured ethyl alcohol (HS 2207.20). The latter group 
can  be  further  disaggregated  into  a  variety  of  further  sub-categories,  for  example 
“specially  denatured”  (HS  2207.20.11),  “denatured”  (HS  2207.20.12)  and  “other 
denatured”  (HS  2207.20.90):  fuel  ethanol  has  no  separate  category.  Biodiesel  is 
located under HS 3824.90 (chemical products not elsewhere specified) – along with 
many other products, again making the identification of biodiesel quantities difficult. 
This  classification  raises  a  further  potentially  significant  issue:  ethanol  is  an   11 
agricultural good (HS 22 falls under the Agreement on Agriculture, AoA), whereas 
biodiesel is an industrial good. With the WTO Agreements treating agricultural and 
industrial goods differently, the trade policy and disciplinary implications could vary, 
potentially substantially, in a possible Doha Development Agenda (DDA) agreement. 
That said, according to Howse et al (2006: 11-12), if the WTO Members so wished, 
they could exclude ethanol from the AoA by listing it as such in the Annex. For more 
on biofuels’ classification see, inter alia, Howse et al, 2006; Condon, 2009; Harmer, 
2009; Le Roy et al, 2009, Switzer and McMahon, 2010. 
 
The range of trade principles governing biofuels trade – and thus the trade policy 
options  available  to  governments  –  are  the  same  as  any  other  commodity.  Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN), non-discrimination and national treatment all apply, as do 
the uses of key policy instruments, notably customs duties (regulated under GATT 
Article  II),  internal  taxation  (Article  III),  quantitative  restrictions  (Article  XI),  or 
domestic subsidies (The Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, SCM). 
Another  option  could  be  to  subsidise  overseas  production  as  part  of  development 
assistance, which could offer almost unlimited policy freedom (we do not consider 
this further in the present paper). Whilst biofuels production, usage and trade give rise 
to a wide range of WTO-compatibility concerns, the design and implementation of 
sustainability criteria lead us to focus on one Article in particular: GATT Article III, 
“National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation”. For a detailed discussion 
of  issues  relating  to  subsidies,  see  Harmer,  2009.  Whilst  Article  XI  might  be 
considered relevant, we note that “the interpretative Note Ad Article III stat[es] that, 
when  a  domestic  measure  applies  both  to  domestic  and  imported  products,  it  is 
Article  III  [as  opposed  to  Article  XI]  that  is  applicable.”  (Tarasofsky,  2008:  8, 
emphasis added). Thus so long as sustainability criteria set facially-neutral obligations 
on all biofuels production regardless of source, Article III is appropriate. 
 
A key question is whether countries can treat biofuels differently in trade policy terms, 
depending  on  whether  they  have  been  produced  ‘sustainably’  or  not.  Article  III 
introduces the concept of ‘like’ products, requiring that regardless of origin, imported 
products cannot be treated less favourably than domestically-produced like products. 
This does not, however, require identical treatment (for example in terms of policy 
instruments used), a point returned to later. Condon (2009: 906ff) makes it clear how   12 
important  the  concept  of  product  likeness  is  to  the  functioning  of  the  GATT 
Agreement, as it is central to the principle of non-discrimination. The Appellate Body 
in the EC-Asbestos case referred to a 1970 GATT Working Party Report to identify 
four criteria that, whilst “neither treaty mandated nor a closed list of criteria” help 
establish product likeness (Condon, 2009: 906. See also Switzer, 2007: 36): 
 
•  Sharing physical properties, nature or quality 
•  Serving the same or similar end-uses 
•  Whether consumers perceive or treat the products as serving the same or similar end 
uses 
•  Sharing the same international tariff classification 
 
All four factors, explicitly or implicitly, refer to demand-side factors. The last of these 
points  is,  for  reasons  explained  earlier,  not  without  its  problems,  but  in  terms  of 
‘ethanol’,  ‘biodiesel’,  etc  is  a  useful  indication  of  closeness  within  a  product 
classification.  The  other  three  refer  to  intrinsic  features  and  consumption-related 
characteristics; there is nothing here that supports a definition of product likeness 
based on Processing and Production Methods (PPMs), an issue we return to shortly. 
In a GATT case, tuna-dolphin, (ruled on in 1994 but not adopted. See, inter alia, de 
Vera,  2008:  673-674  for  details),  the  ruling  went  against  unilateral  US  import 
restrictions (based on whether tuna were caught using dolphin-friendly techniques or 
not). The Panel argued  that like products should be defined only by the products 
themselves, not PPMs (see Condon, 2009: 908). 
 
A subsequent case, shrimp-turtle, “suggests that WTO jurisprudence may be more 
amenable to considerations of sustainable development” (de Vera, 2008: 673) than 
earlier GATT rulings, suggesting there may be a role for production-related criteria in 
the  definition  of  product  likeness,  at  least  insofar  as  they  relate  to  sustainable 
development (recall the quote at the start of the present paper). The US issued licenses 
for imports of shrimp only if they were caught using methods that did not endanger 
sea turtles. Although the AB ruled against this measure, it was not because it was 
unilateral but because the measure “was applied in an arbitrarily discriminatory way.” 
(de  Vera,  2008:  674).  We  consider  the  question  of  arbitrary  and  discriminatory 
measures at greater length below.   13 
 
Is it conceivable that the third criterion, consumer preferences – including consumer 
perceptions – can allow for biofuels to be treated as unlike, based on whether they 
were produced sustainably or not? We argue there are two distinct reasons why WTO 
rules are unlikely to sanction such a policy distinction. The first is simply that both 
case law and a simple practical reading of WTO principles point this way. To use an 
analogy  in  the  context  of  environmental  concerns,  domestic  trade  policies  which 
discriminated  against  goods  whose  production  generated  relatively  high  carbon 
emissions could be allowed. The situation can easily be imagined where this could 
lead to exports from countries whose production or energy-generation sectors faced a 
huge increase in barriers. 
 
The second is more practical in nature and represents a potential Catch 22 situation: 
consumers need access to all types of biofuel to be able to express a preference freely, 
but governments may wish to exclude certain types of biofuel on the basis of actual or 
claimed consumer preference (see also Charnowitz et al, 2008: 10): consumers may 
not freely be able to express their preferences if the available products have been 
limited by ex ante decisions. Indeed, this could cover not only policy decision by 
governments  but  also  those  of  companies,  both  supplying  sustainably-produced 
biofuels and the manufacturers of motor vehicles, who may or may not produce for 
sale vehicles capable of driving on various blends of biofuel.
3 
 
The 1981 Spanish Coffee case saw Spain apply different tariffs to different beans and 
cultivation  methods.  This  case  fell  down  because  the  different  beans  were  then 
blended  together,  denying  consumers  any  opportunity  to  express  preferences  for 
coffee  produced  by  different  methods.  That  said,  this  ruling  still  left  open  the 
possibility that revealed consumer preferences may permit differential treatment of 
goods  based  on  production  methods  (subject  to  the  earlier  caveats).  Concerted 
consumer lobbying, for example, may be one point of reference. The ruling on EC-
Sardines made it clear, however, that, policy-makers must avoid introducing measures 
                                                            
3 This, in turn, raises questions about the valuation of non-market goods using Willingness to Pay 
surveys, for example, and the extent to which they may carry weight in the WTO. We do not consider 
this issue further here.   14 
based  on  consumer  preferences  that  have  been  manipulated  (see  also  Switzer  and 
McMahon, 2010: 17)
4. Cheyne, 2009, meanwhile analyses issues pertaining to the 
environmental labelling of goods and the provision of information to consumers. A 
problem  with  allowing  consumer  preferences  to  help  define  product  likeness  or 
unlikeness is that, as Charnowitz et al (ibid) point out, any Panel or AB would have to 
determine likeness case by case; thus limiting any potential for ex ante learning by 
policy-makers from existing case law in the design of policies for other commodities. 
 
The foregoing leads us to conclude that biofuels cannot be treated differently based on 
the sustainability of their production methods. Thus any sustainability criteria must be 
subject  to  GATT  Article  III.  Given  this,  however,  it  may  be  possible  to  identify 
“General Exemptions” using GATT Article XX (see, for example, the Appellate Body 
[AB] ruling in the shrimp-turtle case). Article XX offers ten exemptions to the GATT 
rules, so long as the “measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade”. Two exemptions 
in particular feature in analyses of the applicability of Article XX to biofuels. Article 
XXb identifies measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”; 
Article XXg identifies measures “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources  if  such  measures  are  made  effective  in  conjunction  with  restrictions  on 
domestic production or consumption”. 
 
One key difference between these exemptions is that, in any case brought against a 
country’s biofuels policy seeking exemptions under Article XX is that measures for 
which  exemption  would  be  sought  under  XXb  would  have  to  be  “necessary”  to 
deliver the desired policy outcome, but only having to be “relating to” the desired 
policy  outcome  under  XXg  (see,  inter  alia,  Tarasofsky,  2008:  9).  In  this  paper, 
however, we do not consider further Article XXb. Case law indicates that it applies 
principally to domestic concerns (as used, inter alia, in relation to clean air and to 
Brazil’s  environment).  Article  XXg  does  not  apply  to  cross-border  measures 
automatically,  however,  but  only  insofar  as  that,  by  referring  to  “domestic” 
production  and  consumption,  a  distinction  is  being  drawn  with  production  and/or 
                                                            
4 This paper does not have page numbers. This numbering takes the title page as Page 1.   15 
consumption in other countries (see also Condon, 2009: 918). One issue not pursued 
further  in  the  present  paper  is  the  question  of  whether  the  domestic/cross-border 
distinction may start to break down in the context of domestic activities affecting 
adversely the global climate, insofar as it affects human health and biosystems. 
 
Important for the debate over sustainability, moreover, Article XXg is a ‘conserving’ 
paragraph, used as a means of conserving exhaustible natural resources. This suggests 
that sustainability criteria need to be clear on what is being conserved, if Article XXg 
is to be used as a defence against any possible WTO challenger over such criteria. 
Both EU and US criteria do refer to certain land types, biodiversity, etc. One could 
even argue that by producing renewable fuels to substitute for fossil fuels, countries 
were  seeking  to  conserve  finite  and  depleting  reserves  of  the  latter  “exhaustible 
natural resources”. Overall, if a country wished to design sustainability criteria to 
minimise the prospect of challenges from other WTO members, reference to issues of 
conservation would help. 
 
Before considering the process of drawing up sustainability criteria in more detail, we 
offer two issues that may warrant consideration but which are not addressed further 
here. First, if biofuels are motivated by concerns over anthropogenic climate change, 
might  scepticism  in  some  quarters  over  the  science  underpinning  anthropogenic 
climate change constitute the basis for an action brought against a WTO Member’s 
sustainability criteria, on the basis they were unnecessary as biofuels could not be 
“related to” (or offered as) a correction for something argued not to exist? Second, 
there  are  broad  differences  in  the  policy  approach  to  cause-and-effect  in  different 
Members, as seen indifferent opinions over the ‘precautionary principle’. The lower 
burden of proof of XXg over XXb, discussed earlier, may however mean a Panel or 
AB felt able to determine the legal merits of a case built on XXg without having to 
form a definitive position on disputed matters of science. 
 
Ultimately,  we  suggest  the  success  of  an  Article  XX  exemption  for  biofuels 
sustainability criteria would rest on those criteria being worded in such a way as to 
conform  with  the  ‘conserving’  agenda  underpinning  Article  XXg.  An  important 
element of this was raised by the AB report on the shrimp-turtle case, where it was 
argued that the meaning of “natural resources” is “by definition, evolutionary”, based   16 
on “contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection and 
conservation of the environment” (quoted in Condon, 2009: 912). How this might 
affect any dispute drawing on XXg, however, as yet remains untested. 
 
What to do or how to do it? The relevance of the TBT Agreement 
In addition to the GATT, another element of the WTO relevant to biofuels is the 
Technical  Barriers  to  Trade  Agreement,  TBTA  (see,  inter  alia,  Condon,  2009; 
Switzer, 2007; Howse et al, 2006; Charnowitz et al, 2008). The TBTA seeks to strike 
a  balance  between,  on  the  one  hand,  both  countries’  rights  to  protect,  inter  alia, 
human, animal and plant life and health, and security interests, alongside the need to 
develop technical regulations and standards; with, on the other hand, the basic trade 
principles  of  the  GATT  (see  the  Preamble  to  the  TBTA).  Indeed  the  Preamble 
identifies  as  a  goal  of  the  TBTA,  “to  further  the  objectives  of  the  GATT”.  With 
products such as biofuels, technical specifications are essential, not only to facilitate 
trade  but,  more  fundamentally,  to  ensure  they  function  as  transport  fuels.  In  the 
present paper we shall  discuss two aspects of the TBTA. First, we shall consider 
briefly the features of goods pertinent to the foregoing discussion of biofuels as traded 
commodities under the GATT. Second, we explore in detail what the TBTA says 
about the process of establishing international agreements on, for example, standards. 
 
It was argued above that the current debate on the nature of product likeness focuses 
on demand-side features. Paragraph 1 of Annex 1 to the TBTA (“Terms and their 
definitions  for  the  purpose  of  this  agreement”),  however,  defines  a  Technical 
Regulation as one “which lays down product characteristics or their related processes 
and  production  methods,  with  which  compliance  is  mandatory”.  This  suggests  a 
product’s PPMs have the same standing as the nature of the good itself. Furthermore, 
in several cases, such as Japan-Alcoholic Beverages and EC-Asbestos, “the physical 
characteristics of a good are only one consideration to the determination as to whether 
products are ‘like’.” Switzer (2007: 36-37, emphasis in original). 
 
The Uruguay Round was negotiated as a Single Undertaking, a notion which applies 
also to the implementation of the various Agreements under the WTO. Relationships 
between  Agreements  are  thus  very  important.  It  cannot  be  inferred  that  a  policy 
referring to PPMs automatically complies with the GATT, as the latter uses no such   17 
phrase. On the other hand, the Preamble to the TBTA makes clear the intention to 
further  the  objectives  of  the  GATT;  and  to  protect  the  environment  and  human, 
animal or plant life or health (repeating goals set out in the General Exemptions of 
GATT Article XX). Furthermore, it repeats a critical element from the chapeau to 
Article XX, demanding that measures are implemented in such a way as to avoid 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries; and to avoid hidden trade 
barriers  (see  also  Article  2  of  the  TBTA,  which  additionally  reinforces  non-
discrimination and national treatment). 
 
From this, considering the GATT and TBTA together, along with relevant case law 
outlined earlier, we argue that whilst PPMs can be used to define product likeness, 
this cannot result in the core principles of the GATT, repeated explicitly in the TBTA, 
being reversed. In the TBTA, as the earlier quote shows, the relevant PPMs are those 
which are product-related. We do not consider further whether non-product related 
PPMs could be a basis for treating biofuels differently, depending on whether they 
embodied  sustainability  or  not,  as  they  too  could  not  be  used  to  defend  a  policy 
otherwise inconsistent with the GATT. We therefore turn to considering a key use of 
the TBTA which is additive to the GATT: it offers clear guidance on how to go about 
negotiating  and  drawing  up  agreements  on  technical  regulations  and  standards.  In 
short, GATT 1994 (reinforced by the TBTA) tells us what can and cannot be done 
with  biofuels  sustainability  criteria;  the  TBTA  provides  additional  guidance  about 
how to establish those criteria. In what follows we also analyse, in the light of the 
TBTA, how a scheme can be set up that ensures biofuels production, in disparate 
countries  worldwide,  conforms  with  the  sustainability  criteria  laid  down  by 
consuming countries? 
 
Article  2.1  of  the  TBTA  requires  that  “Members  shall  ensure  that  in  respect  of 
technical regulations, products imported from the territory of any Member shall be 
accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national 
origin and to like products originating in any other country”. The phrase “no less 
favourable” does not mean, however, that treatment must be identical (Howse et al, 
2006: 24). Equivalence of effect means countries should cooperate and be open about 
detailed criteria (see below). 
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Switzer (2007: 37) argues, following the EC-biotech case, differential treatment can 
avoid  falling  foul  of  this  aspect  of  law  if  “unfavourable  treatment  to  imported 
products…can be explained by ‘factors or circumstances’ unrelated to origin…[Thus] 
a measure which differentiates between otherwise ‘like’ products on the basis of their 
GHG  emission  reduction  levels  may  not  necessarily  result  in  a  finding  of  less 
favourable treatment if the conduct can be explained by reasons unrelated to origin.” 
That said, for the reasons set out above we argue that PPMs, product-related or not, 
would not allow for the differential treatment of biofuels based on GHG emissions 
reductions. Indeed, Paragraph I of Annex 3 to the TBTA requires that, “[w]herever 
appropriate,  the  standardizing  body  shall  specify  standards  based  on  product 
requirements  in  terms  of  performance  rather  than  design  or  descriptive 
characteristics”,  which  brings  us  back  to  the  demand-side  features  of  biofuels 
addressed earlier. 
 
As  part  of  equivalence  of  effect,  Charnowitz  et  al  (2008:  28-29)  note  that 
sustainability reporting requirements must also respect MFN and Art III – and this 
applies to both production and consumption ends of the chain – which, in the context 
of international trade, of course refers to both the exporting and importing country. A 
concern that embraces national treatment and like products is the taxation regime in 
the  importing/consuming  country.  Subject  to  products  being  defined  as  ‘like’, 
differential  taxation  may  be  permitted  if  it  is  facially  neutral  and  does  not  give 
protection to domestic production (see Switzer, 2007: 37-38). 
 
One  important  feature  of  the  TBTA  is  that  it  seeks  to  promote  the  use  of 
“international standards and conformity assessment systems” in the development of 
technical regulations and standards. Article 2.5 states that regulations introduced for a 
legitimate reason and which accord with international standards “shall be rebuttably 
presumed not to create an unnecessary obstacle to international trade.” On the other 
hand where international standards do not exist, if the proposed standard differs from 
existing international standards, or if those existing standards “may have a significant 
effect on trade of other Members”, not only can a Member proposed a standard itself, 
but the TBTA gives clear guidance as to how it should do so. Specifically, Article 2.9 
details an open process which gives other Members opportunities to engage in the 
standard-setting process, whilst Article 2.12 requires that a reasonable period of time   19 
be  left  between  agreement  and  implementation  of  standards,  to  give  exporting 
Members – especially developing countries – time to adapt to them. Article 2.9 does 
allow for the standards to be set prior for consultation, but only if an urgent situation 
means time is of the essence – and consultation must then occur “immediately”. The 
TBTA even sets out a “Code of Good Practice” for standard-setting in Annex 3. 
 
Thus  the  TBTA  promotes  the  use  of  existing  international  standards,  permits 
Members to establish new standards where appropriate international standards do not 
exist, and requires that process to be conducted in an open and multilateral way. This, 
to  quote  both  the  chapeau  to  GATT  Article  XX  and  the  Preamble  to  the  TBTA, 
should  ensure  that  the  agreed  standard  avoids  “arbitrary  or  unjustifiable 
discrimination”.  Furthermore,  if  the  (importing)  country  setting  the  standard  has 
engaged with other Members fully and openly, the chances those same Members will 
then bring an action against those standards on the grounds of WTO-incompatibility 
are greatly reduced. Swinbank (2009: 499), referring to the AB ruling in the shrimp-
turtle case argues, regarding EU sustainability criteria, that “the EU would need to 
show it has engaged in meaningful negotiations with its main suppliers to determine 
credible environmental sustainability criteria” – although that would only be needed if 
an action were brought; and our main point is that such a process reduces the changes 
of that happening in the first place, 
 
From  the  perspective  of  the  EU,  Article  2.7  also  includes  an  interesting  feature: 
“Members  shall  give  positive  consideration  to  accepting  as  equivalent  technical 
regulations  of  other  Members,  even  if  these  regulations  differ  from  their  own, 
provided they are satisfied that these regulations adequately fulfil the objectives of 
their  own  regulations.”  This  phrase  is  very  similar  to  the  EU  principle  of  mutual 
recognition, a keystone of ensuring the free movement of goods and services within 
the SEM without requiring full harmonisation of national laws. Extended to the WTO, 
there remains much scope for variations in WTO members’ legislation which can still 
deliver  regulatory  equivalence  at  lower  (negotiating)  cost.  Moreover  mutual 
recognition,  as  a  basis  for  seeking  free  trade  between  nations,  has  significantly 
stronger  legal  underpinnings  than  the  WTO  DSP,  yet  any  national  differences 
between EU member states are still seen as not presenting a barrier to trade. This also 
re-emphasises the benefits from a multilateral approach to standards-setting.   20 
 
Sustainability standards set, currently, by developed country importers, must then be 
respected by exporters, many of whom will be developing or emerging economies. 
Again, this refers to how something should be done as much as what it is to be done, 
therefore the TBTA is an important reference point. It has already been noted that the 
TBTA provides  guidance over how standards should be determined –  openly  and 
collectively. Another key feature of the TBTA is that whilst the principal focus of the 
TBTA is the work of WTO Members (in particular “Central Government Bodies”; see 
Article  2),  there  is  explicit  scope  for  non-governmental  organisation  (NGO) 
involvement in standard-setting. 
 
With  biofuels,  relevant  NGOs  working  on  standards  and  certification  include  the 
feedstock-specific Better Sugarcane Initiative (BSI), the Roundtable on Sustainable 
Palm Oil (RSPO) and the Roundtable on Responsible Soy Association (RTRS), whilst 
there is also a Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuel (RSB) which covers all feedstocks 
used for biodiesel and bioethanol. The TBTA, first, makes explicit reference to the 
active role NGOs can play in this process. Second, these NGOs operate in an open 
and  transparent  manner  consistent  with  the  principles  underpinning  the  TBTA 
Moreover,  these  representative  bodies  include  (non-governmental)  representation 
from all the relevant producing countries, thus ensuring breadth of participation. They 
also ensure a direct process link between NGOs and WTO Members (for a wider 
discussion on these links see, inter alia, Tallontire and Blowfield, 2000; Bernstein and 
Hannah, 2008; Brassett et al, 2010). 
 
This is exemplified by the BSI, whose current Production Standard is being assessed 
by  the  European  Commission  to  determine  compliance  with  EU  standards.  The 
general  BSI  Standard  contains  five  core  principles,  sub-divided  into  multiple 
indicators.  For  the  “BSI  EU”,  a  sixth  category  has  been  added  which  addresses 
additional EU-specific concerns: “To monitor global warming emissions with a view 
to minimizing climate change impacts”, and “to protect land with high biodiversity 
value, land with high carbon stock and peatlands”. A final point, noted here but not 
developed further in the present paper, concerns direct enforcement costs and indirect 
transaction  costs.  By  having  producers  in  different  countries  represented  on  the 
Roundtables, there is both a direct link from the representatives back to farmers, and   21 
an implicit commitment to the principle of certifiable sustainability criteria, that can 
help ensure greater compliance, at lower cost, than having standards set and enforced 
by distant governments. 
 
Evidence on the Negotiation and Implementation of Sustainability Standards 
In this section, we consider some aspects of sustainability criteria in the context of the 
foregoing. For example, is there any evidence that sustainability criteria have been 
designed explicitly with WTO concerns in mind? Have international fora been used to 
develop  or  promote  sustainability  criteria?  Interviews  conducted  as  part  of  our 
ongoing research indicate that aspects of EU criteria have been designed with WTO 
concerns in mind. Some authors (notably Charnowitz et al, 2008) have argued that 
labour standards  can be designed  and implemented in ways  consistent with WTO 
rules. On the other hand, EU legislation (both the Renewable Energy Directive and 
the  Fuel  Quality  Directive)  exclude  labour/social  standards  from  compulsory 
implementation [double-check the Articles for the proper wording here], because 
whilst it was recognised that, in theory, such rules could be drawn up to be WTO-
consistent, it was felt that such rules would step over some peoples’ red lines and thus 
would  almost  certainly  trigger  an  action.  A  successful  defence  could  not  be 
guaranteed  and,  moreover,  such  an  action  could  threaten  the  entire  structure  of 
sustainability criteria. Instead, reporting requirements on such standards should enable 
examples of good practice to be highlighted, without mandatory reporting resulting in 
violations falling foul of WTO criteria. 
 
The EU sustainability criteria have, in a number of ways, been designed explicitly 
with WTO rules in mind. They were negotiated in a way which allowed for the input 
of other countries (although this should not be taken to imply all concerns were taken 
fully into account); the rules on implementation and reporting apply equally to all 
biofuels,  regardless  of  source;  the  criteria  draw  a  sharp  distinction  between  those 
elements which are compulsory and, in the case of labour/social rules, those which are 
not; and a range of international agreements are drawn upon, with respect to both the 
compulsory and voluntary reporting components of the criteria. Moreover, EU rules 
prevent member states adding further criteria, which will ensure that if the EU criteria 
are WTO-compatible, they will remain so when implemented by the member states 
(see Swinbank, 2009). Also, member states must produce National Action Plans to   22 
show how they will deliver on the sustainability criteria (Switzer and McMahon, 2010: 
6), which provides a checkpoint to ensure conformity of national implementing plans 
with EU and WTO rules. 
 
On the other hand, key concepts in the EU criteria were put in place without clear 
definitions having been agreed (for example ‘highly biodiverse grassland); and whilst 
the default values for GHG emissions savings from different feedstocks published in 
the RED can be replaced with actual values, it may be both difficult and costly for 
developing countries in particular to do so. A further problem – of which the EU 
standards are only one contributory part – is the global proliferation of sustainability 
standards  (Desplechin,  2010).  Standards  which  are  incompatible  can  create 
uncertainty and inhibit investment and trade. Such concerns can be understood as 
further  support  for  collective,  multilateral,  negotiation.  Mutual  recognition  of 
standards has advantages, but the equivalence of different standards and rules may be 
difficult and costly to determine. 
 
There have, in the latter part of 2010, been very interesting developments as regards 
to certification of palm oil production by the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 
(RSPO). First, Unilever announced a plan to obtain all of its palm oil from plantations 
certified  by  the  Roundtable  on  Sustainable  Palm  Oil  (RSPO)  within  five  years. 
Second, the Dutch government has presented a manifesto, signed by all the suppliers 
and purchasers of palm oil to trade only RSPO-certified palm oil in The Netherlands 
by  2015.  Agreements  such  as  this  are  important  markers  for  such  schemes,  as  it 
indicates  they  are  capable  of  ‘passing’  important  market  tests  of  commercial 
relevance  and  applicability.  In  so  doing,  this  renders  moot  issues  surrounding  the 
expression of consumers’ preferences, as suppliers see commercial gain from making 
this switch; whilst consumers are unlikely to argue that the inability to buy palm oil 
products  produced  unsustainably  has  impaired  their  freedom  of  choice.  It  should, 
however, be recognised that both campaign groups and RSPO members acknowledge 
their certification scheme cannot yet be taken as a cast-iron guarantee of sustainability 
of source. It is, however, an important step towards sustainable production. 
 
As a footnote to this, Annex I of the TBTA confirms that “This Agreement deals only 
with technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures related to   23 
products  or  processes  and  production  methods.  Standards  as  defined  by  ISO/IEC 
Guide 2 may be mandatory or voluntary. For the purpose of this Agreement standards 
are defined as voluntary and technical regulations as mandatory documents. Standards 
prepared by the international standardization community are based on consensus. This 
Agreement covers also documents that are not based on consensus.” This distinction 
is potentially important as voluntary schemes do not have to be notified to the WTO. 
This  explains  why,  for  example,  the  Brazilian  government  is  taking  a  hands-off 
approach to such schemes, but monitors them very carefully to ensure WTO rules are 
not violated in their implementation. 
 
Ultimately, the TBTA would permits regulation under the banner of sustainability (as 
a  different  example,  Australian  biosecurity  rules  have  some  kind  of  sustainability 
element  in  them)  but  no  one  is  absolutely  certain,  given  the  plethora  of  different 
standards  being  developed,  how  much  and  of  what  type  of  standard  is  permitted, 
combined with a lack of clarity from the WTO given the limited case law in this area. 
One observation from de Vera (2008: 674), is that, “it is critical to note that no WTO 
Panel or Appellate Body has explicitly permitted coercive embargoes.” It is possible 
that sustainability criteria are WTO-compatible (for example on embargoes, neither 
EU nor US rules prevent the import of biofuels produced unsustainably; it is simply 
that such biofuels would not count towards blenders’ or countries’ usage or GHG 
emissions-reductions targets). Such compatibility cannot be taken from granted, but 
must be worked on from the outset, however. Ultimately, one can argue that a lack of 
legal clarity caused by a lack of case law is a good thing, if it means that WTO 
Members have had no reason to bring actions against each other; a situation that is 
more like if trading partners, Member governments and NGOs are part of the policy 
design and implementation process at all stages. 
 
Conclusions 
A  key  motivation  for  biofuels  production  sustainability  criteria  is  to  ensure  that 
biofuels, which are being produced and consumed in ever-rising quantities produce 
clear  environmental  benefits,  especially  in  terms  of  GHG  emissions  reductions, 
compared  with  the  fossil-fuel  based  transport  fuels  they  are,  in  part,  replacing. 
Questions have been raised about the WTO-compatibility of these schemes. In this 
paper we argue that the plethora of WTO rules apply to biofuels as they apply to any   24 
traded commodity. This leads to a number of key points regarding biofuels and the 
policies that can, or cannot, be adopted based on how ‘sustainable’ their production is. 
 
First, we consider it highly unlikely that biofuels can be declared ‘unlike’, depending 
on whether they were produced sustainably or not. This means that GATT Article III 
applies to all resulting policies addressing biofuels sustainability; A WTO Member 
cannot apply trade barriers which discriminate overtly against unsustainable biofuels. 
It  can  further  be  concluded  from  this  that  a  product’s  Processing  and  Production 
Methods (PPMs) are unlikely to be considered relevant for defining product likeness; 
and that this applies both to product-related PPMS and, a fortiori, to non-product 
related PPMs. 
 
Second, If Article III applies to biofuels, then if a WTO Member does seek to treat 
biofuels differently, based on the sustainability of their production, Article XXb or, in 
the context of cross-border considerations, XXg would be the relevant reference-point 
for  a  general  exemption.  This  must,  however,  be  applied  in  accordance  with  the 
principles of national treatment and non-discrimination. Furthermore, under Article 
XX  no  measure  could  represent  “arbitrary  or  unjustifiable  discrimination  between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade”. 
 
Third, in the context of the WTO Agreements representing a Single Undertaking, we 
have argued that whilst the GATT sets out what can and must not be done, the TBTA 
offers clear  guidance on how to do it. Specifically, one  goal of the  TBTA is “to 
further the objectives of GATT 1994”; whilst the use of common language and terms 
identifies  areas  where  the  TBTA  complements  the  GATT  and  thus  further  the 
objectives of the latter. Specifically, the TBTA provides guidance about how to avoid 
measures which are, or could be deemed, arbitrary and unjustifiable. Key features of 
the TBTA are that imports and domestic production must be treated in an equivalent 
fashion (but not necessarily in an identical manner); that the process of drawing up 
standards  should,  where  possible,  draw  on  existing  international  standards  and 
agreements or, if that is not possible or appropriate, involve other countries openly 
and actively in the drawing up and implementation of a new set of standards. Not only 
does this approach respect explicit TBTA provisions; in practical terms it makes it   25 
less likely one of those participating Members will subsequently bring an action via 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding. 
 
We have argued that there is clear evidence that EU and US standards reflect some of 
these goals, both in their preparation and implementation. Furthermore, there is clear 
evidence that multilateral bodies, such as the RSPO and BSI, have prepared producer 
certification  systems  to  comply  with  importing  countries’  sustainability  standards, 
with the latter’s “BSI EU” standard being considered by the European Commission 
for its compatibility with the EU sustainability standard. In the case of the RSPO, a 
further  boost  has  come,  first,  from  Unilever  pursuing  a  goal  of  purchasing  only 
RSPO-certified palm oil; and, second, a goal coordinated by the Dutch government to 
make all palm oil and related products on the Dutch market from RSPO-certified 
sources,  also  by  2015.  That  said,  some  exporting  countries  continue  to  monitor 
closely the implementation of sustainability criteria by importing countries, to ensure 
continued conformity with WTO rules. 
 
Ultimately it is not that there are good or bad biofuels but, rather biofuels either done 
well or done badly. In a new and evolving policy area such as this, the meaning and 
understanding of these key concepts will also evolve; indeed, the TBTA recognises 
the non-stationary nature of policy when it makes clear that standard-setting must (but 
also can only) take account of available scientific and technical information (Article 
2.2, emphasis added). The dynamic nature of both policy and its context should also, 
therefore, be reflected in the interpretation and monitoring of sustainability criteria in 
the context of WTO compliance. 
 
In a recent speech to the 2010 World Energy Congress, Pascal Lamy (Lamy, 2010) 
picked  up  the  Congress’s  theme  of  the  Three  A’s  –  Access,  Availability  and 
Acceptability  (my  emphasis).  He  also  spoke  of  a  “more  sophisticated  WTO  rule-
book”. In the context of a successful conclusion to the Doha Development Agenda, 
the draft text of which includes a call for the liberalisation of environmental goods 
and services (EGS), Lamy’s speech reflects a pattern discernible in some of the cases 
already  discussed.  Specifically,  there  are  ongoing  efforts  to  incorporate  both 
environmental goods and environmental concerns more fully and explicitly into the 
WTO  Agreements.  The  need  to  ensure  the  WTO-compatibility  of  biofuels-related   26 
policies will only grow. It is important to accept that the general rules and precepts of 
the WTO apply to such goods; and that those rules not only tell policy-makers what to 
do, or not, but also give guidance on how to make WTO-consistent policies. 
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